The Cuba Détente Reversal: Forty Miles of Foreign Policy Whiplash
By Julian Valerius , March 3, 2025
Topic: Foreign Policy
Opening Thesis
The administration reversed the previous administration's partial normalization of relations with Cuba, which had itself reversed the previous administration's partial normalization, which had reversed sixty years of embargo. Cuba is forty miles from Florida and approximately four policy reversals from coherent American strategy.
What Happened
- Executive order signed March 3, 2025, reimposing sanctions on Cuba that were relaxed under the Biden administration
- Sanctions include: restrictions on remittances, closure of certain consular services, reimposition of Cuba on the State Sponsors of Terrorism list
- Biden had removed Cuba from the terrorism list in January 2025 as part of a prisoner exchange agreement
- The reimposition occurred 58 days after the removal
- Cuban-American population in Florida: approximately 1.5 million, concentrated in Miami-Dade County
THE HISTORICAL ECHO
American Cuba policy has been determined by the electoral map of Florida since 1962. The embargo was imposed by Kennedy, maintained by every subsequent president, partially relaxed by Obama, partially reimposed by Trump, partially re-relaxed by Biden, and now partially re-reimposed by Trump. Each adjustment was calibrated to the preferences of Cuban-American voters in Miami-Dade County, whose voting behavior has shifted from reliably Republican (pre-2020) to competitive (post-2020).
The policy has nothing to do with Cuba. Cuba's GDP is $107 billion. Its military is negligible. Its intelligence capabilities are modest. It poses no strategic threat to the United States. The embargo persists because Florida has 30 electoral votes and Cuban-American voters have high turnout rates and strong opinions about Cuba policy. This is democracy working as intended: a small, organized constituency with intense preferences shapes policy that affects a country of 11 million people who cannot vote in American elections.
THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTINUITY
The State Department's Cuba desk has implemented four mutually contradictory policy frameworks in the last ten years. The career officers who manage the relationship have developed a particular expertise: implementing today's policy while maintaining the institutional memory and documentation necessary to reverse it when the next administration arrives. This is not cynicism. It is professional competence adapted to political reality.
WHAT THIS ACTUALLY CHANGES
For Cubans: remittances decline, visa processing slows, and the modest economic improvements of the relaxation period reverse. For Cuban-Americans: a policy signal that may influence turnout in Miami-Dade. For American strategy: nothing. The embargo has not achieved its stated objective (regime change) in 63 years and is not expected to achieve it in the 64th.
POLLERBULL SIGNAL
- What moves odds: Cuba policy enters our Florida model through the Cuban-American turnout modifier. The reimposition of sanctions is estimated to increase Republican-leaning Cuban-American turnout by 1.5–2 points in Miami-Dade, which in a statewide race translates to approximately 0.3 points. In a state decided by 1.2 points in 2024, this is not negligible.
- What would falsify this: If younger Cuban-Americans (under 40) do not respond to the sanctions reimposition with increased turnout, the generational shift in Cuban-American political behavior is more advanced than our model assumes.