DOGE and the Appropriations Clause: Who Controls the Purse?

By Charles Whitcombe , March 1, 2025

Topic: Constitutional Law

The Proposition

The Department of Government Efficiency has accessed federal payment systems and cancelled contracts totaling billions of dollars. The constitutional question is not whether waste exists in the federal budget, it does, but whether an advisory body appointed by the president has the authority to cancel expenditures that Congress has appropriated. The answer, under any faithful reading of Article I, Section 9, Clause 7, is no.

WHAT HAPPENED

THE CONSERVATIVE DIAGNOSIS

The Appropriations Clause states: "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law." This is not ambiguous. Congress appropriates. The executive spends. The executive does not un-appropriate.

The conservative who cheers DOGE's spending cuts must contend with the mechanism by which those cuts are achieved. If the president can cancel appropriated spending through an advisory body, then the power of the purse has been transferred from Congress to the executive. This is precisely the concentration of fiscal power that the Founders designed the Appropriations Clause to prevent.

The conservative case for DOGE's mission, reducing waste, is sound. The conservative case for DOGE's method, cancelling appropriated funds without congressional authorization, is constitutionally illiterate. The distinction between ends and means is the distinction between conservatism and expediency.

THE LIBERAL ERROR

The progressive objection to DOGE is correct on constitutional grounds but undermined by precedent. When the Obama administration declined to enforce immigration laws, it exercised the same theory of executive discretion that DOGE now invokes: the president decides how to allocate enforcement resources. The progressive who cheered prosecutorial discretion in 2012 cannot coherently object to spending discretion in 2025 without acknowledging that both represent the same expansion of executive power.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION

The core question is whether the Appropriations Clause creates a mandate to spend or merely a permission to spend. If it creates a mandate, then the president must spend what Congress appropriates. If it creates only permission, then the president may decline to spend, which renders the congressional power of the purse optional.

The Impoundment Control Act of 1974 resolved this question legislatively: the president may defer spending but not cancel it without congressional approval. DOGE's contract cancellations appear to violate this framework by permanently cancelling obligations rather than deferring them.

WHAT PRUDENCE REQUIRES

A prudent conservative supports spending reform through the legislative process: hearings, oversight, appropriations riders, and statutory changes. These mechanisms are slow, frustrating, and constitutionally correct. The alternative, executive cancellation of legislative spending, is fast, satisfying, and constitutionally destructive.

SOURCES

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